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-interspousal Immunity-AuToMOBILE NEGLIGENCE-Surratt V. Thompson
At common law neither spouse could maintain an action against the other.'
With the passage of the Married Woman's Acts in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury2 it was agreed that a cause of action would then lie for property
torts,3 but there was confusion as to whether the statutes gave a new cause
of action for personal torts between the spouses. It therefore became a ques-
tion of statutory interpretation, with the terminology of most of the statutes
being consistent with either conclusion. 4 The first courts to interpret the
statutes held that no cause of action had been conferred5 and thereby laid
the foundation for what subsequently became the majority view-that im-
munity was still the rule as to personal torts betwen spouses. However, a
forceful dissent to a United States Supreme Court decision 6 indicated that a
11 W. BLACKSTONE, CaMmENTARIES *442; 41 Am. JUR. 2d Husband and Wife § 522
(1968); 41 CJ.S. Husband and Wife S 396 (1944). See, e.g, Alexander v. Alexander,
85 Va. 353, 7 S.F. 335 (1888).
2The statutes are collected in 3 C. VERNIER, AmERicAN FAMILY LAWS §§ 167, 179,
180 (1935).
3 See, e.g., Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955), wherein the
court held:
... [T]hese sections [the Virginia Married Woman's Act] empower each spouse
to maintain actions at law for wrongful invasions of their respective property
rights as if they had never been married. Id. at 223, 89 S.E.2d at 74.
See also McCurdy, Property Torts Between Spouses and Use During Marriage of the
Matrimonial Home Owned by the Other, 2 VIm. L. Rav. 447 (1957).
4 The statutes may be divided into seven general groups, the most common being
those which permit suits by and against married women as though they were unmarried.
See McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030,
1037, 1050 (1930).
The applicable section of the Virginia Married Woman's Acts is typical of the com-
mon form:
A married woman may contract and be contracted with and sue and be sued in
the same manner and with the same consequences as if she were unmarried ....
Va. Code Ann. § 55-36 (Cum. Supp. 1971).
5 The leading case is Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (assault and bat-
tery) wherein the Supreme Court said:
The [District of Columbia] statute was not intended to give a right of action as
against the husband, but to allow the wife, in her own name, to maintain actions
of tort which at common law must be brought in the joint names of herself and
her husband. Id. at 617.
See also Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 NZ. 320 (1936) (negligence); Keister
v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.F. 315 (1918) (death by wrongful act); Poling v. Poling,
116 W. Va. 187, 179 S.E. 604 (1935) (negligence); Sanford, Personal Torts Within the
Family, 9 VAND. L. Rav. 823, 826 n.6 (1956).6 In his well-known dissent in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) Justice
Harlan said:
I cannot believe that [the District of Columbia statute] intended to permit the
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new cause of action had arisen with the enactment of the statutes, and the
minority view thus evolved. 7 The result is that today much confusion exists,
with a majority of the courts still recognizing the interspousal immunity
rule as to personal torts, but an ever-increasing minority allowing such action
between the spouses.8
In the recent case of Surratt v. Thompson,9 the Virginia Supreme Court
joined the growing minority view, in part, by abrogating the interspousal
immunity rule in automobile negligence cases. 10 In that case Cornelia Jane
Surratt died as a result of a collision between an automobile driven by her
husband, in which she was riding, and an automobile driven by a third
person. Her administrator brought an action for wrongful death against
her husband and the third person. In allowing the administrator to recover,
the court held that the reasons for interspousal immunity are no longer ap-
plicable in cases of automobile negligence.
The historical grounds for denying the interspousal action have been
wife to sue the husband separately, in tort, for the recovery, including damages
for the detention, of her property, and at the same time deny her the right to
sue him, separately, for a tort committed against her person. Id. at 623.
Virtually every minority jurisdiction that abrogates the interspousal immunity rule
on the basis that the statute allows personal tort actions between spouses does so in
reliance on the Thompson dissent.
7See, e.g., Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962)
(negligence); Bushnell v. Bushnell, 103 Conn. 583, 131 A. 432 (1925) (negligence); Brown
v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914) (assault and battery); Brown v. Gosser, 262
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); (tort action filed prior to marriage); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore.
242, 287 P.2d 585 (1955) (intentional tort action with decision providing an excellent
discussion of other leading cases). See also Sanford, Personal Torts Within the Family,
9 VAND. L. REV. 823, 826 n.7 (1956) for a list of other cases following the Thompson
dissent.
8See H. CLARK, THE LAW or DoMaS'Tc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 254-55
(1968); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 863-64 (4th ed. 1971); Annor,
43 A.L.R.2d 632, 647-51, 664-70 (1955).
9 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971).
10 In Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971), a case decided earlier
the same day, the court abrogated the rule of parental immunity in automobile negli-
gence litigation. Because the arguments and policy reasons are similar in both issues and
the Smith decision was rendered first, it is necessary to refer to the Smith decision
when the court so indicates in the Surratt opinion.
11 Generally, the historical arguments were that the husband and wife were one and
therefore it was impossible for one to sue the other; that the husband was liable for the
wife's tort actions, which meant he would be placed in the position of suing himself
were he to bring suit; and that the wife could sue only by joining the husband as
plaintiff which would place the husband on both sides of the litigation. Cf. Norfolk
& W.R.R. v. Prindle, 82 Va. 122 (1886). See generally W. PRoss-R, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS 859-61 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, Torts Between Persons in Domestic
Relations, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030, 1031-35 (1930).
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replaced by public policy arguments. Chief among these has been the argu-
ment that such suits would disrupt the domestic peace and tranquility of
the home.'2 It has also been said that abrogation of the rule would have an
adverse effect upon the family exchequer.'3 These arguments were summarily
disposed of by the Virginia Supreme Court by reference to the widespread
existence of liability insurance in automobile negligence cases.' 4 When
liability insurance is introduced, the primary danger is that fraud and collu-
sion between the spouses will be encouraged.15 Citing a previous decision
of its own,16 the Virginia court expressed its belief that the courts are capa-
ble of detecting fictitious claims and that parties who are entitled to relief
in the courts should not be denied access thereto simply because others might
12 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Corren v. Corren, 47 So.
2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Reingold v. Reingold, 115 N.J.L. 532, 181 A. 153 (Ct. Err. & App.
1935) (parental immunity); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915);
see Annot., 43 AL.R.2d 632, 661 (1955). But see Apitz v. Dames, 205 Ore. 242, 287 P.2d
585 (1955) where the court stated:
We hold that when a husband inflicts intentional harm upon the person of his
wife, the peace and harmony of the home has been so damaged that there is no
danger that it will be further impaired by the maintenance of an action for
damages and she may therefore maintain an action. Id. at 252, 287 P.2d at 598.
See also note 33 infra.
13 Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939) (parental immunity); Roller
v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 P. 788 (1905) (parental immunity).
14The court referred to Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 SE.2d 190 (1971)
wherein it said:
The enactment of Virginia uninsured motorist laws in 1958 has effected a
further and major change of circumstances. One of these laws requires an un-
insured motor vehicle endorsement to each policy of automobile liability in-
surance issued or delivered by an insurer licensed in this State covering a motor
vehicle principally garaged or used in this State. VA. CoDE ANN. § 38.1-381
(1970) ....
The very high incidence of liability insurance covering Virginia-based motor
vehicles, together with the mandatory uninsured motorist endorsements to in-
surance policies has made our rule of parental immunity anachronistic when
applied to automobile accident litigation. In such litigation, the rule can be no
longer supported as generally calculated to promote the peace and tranquility
of the home and the advantageous disposal of the parents' exchequer. A rule
adopted for the common good now prejudices the great majority. Id. at 184-85,
183 S.E.2d at 193-94.
15 Lubowitz v. Taines, 293 Mass. 39, 198 N.E. 320 (1936) (by implication); Harvey
v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N.W. 305 (1927); Hastings v. Hastings, 33 NJ. 247, 163
A.2d 147 (1960) (parental immunity); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d
533 (1965); Smith v. Smith, 205 Ore. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955).
16 Once again the court referred to Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 SZE.2d 190
(1971) wherein it cited Midkiff v. Midkiff, 201 Va. 829, 113 S.E.2d 875 (1960): "If
actions were barred because of the possibility of fraud many wrongs would be per-
mitted to go without redress: Id. at 833, 113 S.E.2d at 878.
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abuse the privilege. 17 Thus the Surratt court was left with the disability of
a wife to sue her husband for a personal tort under the common law as the
"sole existing reason" 18 for continuing the interspousal immunity rule.
Rather than overrule a previous holding that the Married Woman's Act does
not give a new cause of action for a personal tort between the spouses,19 the
court shunned the usual minority reasoning20 and based its decision upon
a theory that the common law is viable and capable of adapting to changed
circumstances.21
17 When the issue of fraud and collusion where insurance exists is introduced this
reasoning is followed in all minority jurisdictions. In Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181,
183 S.E.2d 190 (1971) the court quoted from the New Jersey decision of France v.
A.P.A. Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970), -noted in 5 U. RicH. L. REv.
410 (1971), which had likewise abrogated parental immunity in automobile negligence
cases: "We do not believe that the judiciary should continue to refuse to hear an
entire class of actions simply because some of these claims may be the product of
venality." Id. at 505, 267, A.2d at 493.
For an extensive discussion of the aspects of fraud and collusion in these cases see
Immer v. Risko, 56 NJ. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (abrogating interspousal immunity).
18212 Va. 191, 192, 183 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1971). The court restricted itself to the
arguments of disruption of domestic peace and tranquility, the adverse effect upon
the family exchequer, fraud and collusion, and the common law disability of the wife
to sue her husband for a personal tort. The other arguments of those jurisdictions
favoring the interspousal immunity rule were ignored in the majority opinion, although
in the dissents of Justices Cochran and Harman an additional argument was noted
(change in the rule as one for the legislature).
19 In the leading case of Keister v. Keister, 123 Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918) the court
said:
The substantive civil right in question is a legal existence-a legal personality-of
a married woman, separate and apart from the legal personality of her husband,
during coverture. Such a right a married woman had not and has not at common
law. Id at 161, 96 S.E. at 316.
The Married Woman's Acts had failed to bestow upon the wife a legal personality
necessary to create a substantive right of action in her against her husband for per-
sonal injury. Her remedy to sue had been given by the statute but the statute had
failed to so separate her from her husband's flesh as to make it possible for him to
inflict a purely personal tort on her. See Furey v. Furey, 193 Va. 727, 71 S.E.2d 91
(1952) for an application of this reasoning as applied to an action for personal injuries
incurred before the marriage.
20The traditional minority reasoning has been to construe the Married Woman's
Acts as conferring upon the spouse a cause of action which did not exist at common
law. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619 (1910) (dissenting opinion).
See Annot, 43 A.L.R.2d 632, 664-70 (1955).
21 The court again quoted the New Jersey Supreme Court, this time the decision of
State v. Culver, 23 N.J. 495, 129 A.2d 715 (1957):
One of the great virtues of the common law is its dynamic nature that makes
it adaptable to the requirements of society at the time of its application in court.
There is not a rule of the common law in force today that has not evolved from
some earlier rule of common law, gradually in some instances, more suddenly in
others, leaving the common law of today when compared with the common
[Vol. 6:370
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Other arguments espoused by those jurisdictions upholding interspousal
immunity have been that the abrogation of the rule will burden the courts
with litigation arising from trivial disputes between the spouses;22 that
there is an adequate remedy Offered the damaged spouse in other courts;23
and that the change is one for the legislature rather than the courts.24
Finding these arguments less than compelling,25 a growing number of juris-
dictions have abrogated the interspousal immunity rule in all actions, either
by case decision26 or by statute.27
law of centuries ago as different as day is from night. The nature of the common
law requires that each time a rule of law is applied it be carefully scrutinized
to make sure that the conditions and needs of the times have not so changed as
to make further application of it the instrument of injustice. Dean Pound posed
the problem admirably in his Interpretations of Legal History (1922) when he
stated, "Law must be stable, and yet it cannot stand still." Id. at 505, 129 A.2d at
721.
Thus the Virginia Supreme Court concluded:
... [N]othing in the nature of the common law requires us to adhere to an out-
moded concept that a wife cannot so separate herself from her husband's flesh
as to be capable of maintaining an action against him. 212 Va. at 194, 182 S.E.2d
at 202.22 See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 US. 611 (1910); Keister v. Keister, 123
Va. 157, 96 S.E. 315 (1918); see Annot., 43 AL.R.2d 632, 663 (1955).23 See, e.g., Drake v. Drake, 145 Minn. 388, 177 N.W. 624 (1920); Austin v. Austin,
136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924); see Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 632, 663-64 (1955).
24See, e.g., Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 133 N.W.2d 907 (1965); Morrissett v.
Morrissett, 80 Nev. 566, 397 P.2d 184 (1964); see Annor., 43 A.L.R.2d 632, 662-63 (1955).
25 The argument that the abrogation of the interspousal immunity rule in personal
torts would encourage litigation has been declared untenable by many minority courts.
See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d
480 (Ky. 1953).
The argument that adequate remedies are available in other courts is clearly fallacious.
The remedies through divorce and criminal procedure do not offer adequate remedies
since neither compensates for the damage done nor covers all torts which may be com-
mitted. See Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917); W. PossER, HArDBOOK
OF TnE LAW OF TORTS 862 (4th ed. 1971).
The argument that the change in the interspousal immunity rule is one which should
be made by the legislature is seldom challenged by the courts which follow the minority
view for the reason that the traditional minority view arose on the basis of the dissent
in Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 619 (1910) which indicated that the Married
Woman's Acts gave a cause of action for personal torts. In other words, most of the
minority view courts feel that the legislature has already made the change. However,
in Virginia the court has held that the Married Woman's Acts did not give rise to a
new cause of action and yet it gave relief in the Surratt case. It was implied in the
dissents of Justices Cochran and Harman that the change in the rule should be made
by the legislature, but the majority ignored this argument. See note 18 supra.
26 See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TE LAW OF TORTS 884 and n.61 (4th ed.
1971); Annot., 43 AJ.R.2d 632, 647-57, 664-71 (1955).
27 See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIGATIONS LAW § 3-313 (McKinney 1964) (originally enacted
as N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 57 (McKinney 1937)). When New York amended the
1972]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW Vl
It is noteworthy that Surratt confines its rejection of the immunity rule
to automobile negligence cases and that the court chose a forthright ap-
proach to changing the law rather than reading into the Married Woman's
Act a cause of action for personal torts. 28 This case places Virginia between
the extremes of allowing no personal tort actions whatsoever and allowing
all such actions.
The textwriters clearly favor a rule which allows all tort actions between
the spouses and draws no distinction between intentional and negligent con-
duct.29 It is submitted that that is the most logical approach and that Vir-
ginia should now totally abrogate the interspousal immunity rule. If the
spouse can sue in contract, 0 for a property tort,3 ' and for negligence in the
operation of an automobile, 32 why deny an action for an intentional tort"
or one involving negligence not arising from the operation of an automo-
bile? The question should be whether there has been unprivileged conduct
Domestic Relations Law, it also amended the Insurance Law to provide that no liability
insurance policy insured against liability for injuries to person or property of the
insured's spouse unless express provision included such in the policy. N.Y. INs. LAw
§ 167(3) (McKinney 1937); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 52-5 (1966) and 52-5.1 (Supp. 1970).
28 The statute is in derogation of the common law and should be strictly construed.
Only by a strained construction of a statute such as Virginia's (VA. CoDE ANN. § 55-36
(Cum. Supp. 1971)) could a court conclude that the statute conferred a cause of
action for a personal tort between the spouses. By deciding the issue on the basis of
a viable common law rather than in giving the statute a strained interpretation, the
court rendered a more forceful opinion.
29H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DoMzsac RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 252-56 (1968);
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 861-64 (4th ed. 1971); Albertsworth,
Recognition of New Interests in the Law of Torts, 10 CAL. L. Rav. 461, 471-80 (1922);
Farage, Recovery For Torts Between Spouses, 10 IND. LJ. 290 (1934); McCurdy,
Personal Injury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. Rv. 303 (1959); McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relation, 43 HARv. L. REv. 1030 (1930); Sanford, Personal
Torts Within the Family, 9 VAND. L. REv. 823 (1956).
3OSee, e.g., Klotz v. Klotz, 202 Va. 393, 117 S.E.2d 650 (1961); Harlan v. Weatherly,
183 Va. 49, 31 S.E.2d 263 (1944); Alexander v. Alexander, 85 Va. 353, 7 S.E. 335 (1888).
31 See, e.g., Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Bennett, 197 Va. 216, 89 S.E.2d 69 (1955).
32 Surratt v. Thompson, 212 Va. 191, 183 S.E.2d 200 (1971).
33 Dean Prosser has aptly stated the reasoning of the minority view jurisdictions
regarding the maintenance of an action for an intentional tort between the spouses:
The chief reason relied upon by all these majority view courts, however, is that
personal tort actions between husband and wife would disrupt and destroy the
peace and harmony of the home, which is against the policy of the law. This is
on the bald theory that after a husband has beaten his wife, there is a state of
peace and harmony left to be disturbed; and that if she is sufficiently injured or
angry to sue him for it, she will be soothed and deterred from reprisals by
denying her the legal remedy . . . and although the same courts refuse to find
any disruption of domestic tranquility if she sues him for a tort to her property,
or brings a criminal prosecution against him. If this reasoning appeals to the
reader, let him by all means adopt it.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 863 (4th ed. 1971).
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which is tortious. If so, the potential liability should be the same as if the
partners were strangers; that is, the relationship per se should not bar any
action. However, the relationship may militate against some actions which
would be proper were the conduct between strangers. In negligent torts
the relationship should be treated as a circumstance in the consideration of
what is "reasonable under the circumstances" and in intentional torts the
existence of the relationship might give rise in a proper situation to implied
consent. 34
The Surratt case represents a realistic approach to today's interspousal
relations in its partial abandonment of the outmoded common law rule of
interspousal immunity. Hopefully, in the near future, Virginia will take
another realistic step and completely abandon all forms of interspousal im-
munity.
R.F.P.
34 The privileged conduct would only cover a small area of the marital relation but
at the same time would be broad enough to bar trivial actions. Outside of this small area
of privileged conduct, all actions should be maintainable.
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